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Abstract
In every negotiation with a deadline, one of the nego-
tiating parties has to accept an oer to avoid a break
o. A break o is usually an undesirable outcome for
both parties, therefore it is important that a negotiator
employs a procient mechanism to decide under which
conditions to accept. When designing such conditions
one is faced with the acceptance dilemma: accepting
the current oer may be suboptimal, as better oers
may still be presented. On the other hand, accepting
too late may prevent an agreement from being reached,
resulting in a break o with no gain for either party.
Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations
between automated agents and by the results and in-
sights of the automated negotiating agents competi-
tion (ANAC), we classify and compare state-of-the-art
generic acceptance conditions. We focus on decoupled
acceptance conditions, i.e. conditions that do not de-
pend on the bidding strategy that is used. We per-
formed extensive experiments to compare the perfor-
mance of acceptance conditions in combination with a
broad range of bidding strategies and negotiation do-
mains. Furthermore we propose new acceptance con-
ditions and we demonstrate that they outperform the
other conditions that we study. In particular, it is shown
that they outperform the standard acceptance condition
of comparing the current oer with the oer the agent
is ready to send out. We also provide insight in to why
some conditions work better than others and investigate
correlations between the properties of the negotiation
environment and the ecacy of acceptance conditions.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is an important process to reach trade
agreements, and to form alliances or resolve conicts.
The eld of negotiation originates from various dis-
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ciplines including articial intelligence, economics, so-
cial science, and game theory (e.g., [2, 16, 20]). The
strategic{negotiation model has a wide range of applica-
tions, such as resource and task allocation mechanisms,
conict resolution mechanisms, and decentralized infor-
mation services [16].
A number of successful negotiation strategies have al-
ready been established both in literature and in imple-
mentations [6, 7, 12, 13, 19]. And more recently, in 2010
seven new negotiation strategies were created to partic-
ipate in the rst automated negotiating agents compe-
tition (ANAC 2010) [3] in conjunction with the Ninth
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-10). During post tour-
nament analysis of the results, it became apparent that
dierent agent implementations use various conditions
to decide when to accept an oer. In every negotiation
with a deadline, one of the negotiating parties has to
accept an oer to avoid a break o. Therefore, it is
important for every negotiator to employ a mechanism
to decide under which conditions to accept. However,
designing a proper acceptance condition is a dicult
task: accepting too late may result in the break o of
a negotiation, while accepting too early may result in
suboptimal agreements.
The importance of choosing an appropriate accep-
tance condition is conrmed by the results of ANAC
2010 (see Table 1). Agents with simple acceptance
criteria were ranked at the bottom, while the more
sophisticated time- and utility-based criteria obtained
a higher score. For instance, the low ranking of Agent
Smith was due to a mistake in the implementation of
the acceptance condition [27].
Despite its importance, the theory and practice of
acceptance conditions has not yet received much atten-
tion. The goal of this paper is to classify current ap-
proaches and to compare acceptance conditions in an
experimental setting. Thus in this paper we will con-
centrate on the nal part of the negotiation process:
the acceptation of an oer. We focus on decoupled ac-
ceptance conditions: i.e., generic acceptance conditions
that can be used in conjunction with an arbitrary bid-
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Rank Agent Acceptance method
1 Agent K Time and utility based
2 Yushu Time and utility based
3 Nozomi Time and utility based
4 IAMhaggler Utility based only
5 FSEGA Utility based only
6 IAMcrazyHaggler Utility based only
7 Agent Smith Time and utility based
Table 1: An overview of the rank and acceptance con-
ditions of every agent in ANAC 2010.
ding strategy.
Our contribution is fourfold:
1. We give an overview and provide a categorization
of current decoupled acceptance conditions.
2. We introduce a formal negotiation model that sup-
ports the use of arbitrary acceptance conditions.
3. We compare a selection of current generic accep-
tance conditions and evaluate them in an experi-
mental setting.
4. We propose new acceptance conditions and test
them against established acceptance conditions, us-
ing varying types of bidding techniques.
2 Experiments
In order to experimentally test the ecacy of an accep-
tance condition, we equipped a set of agents with an
acceptance condition, and measured its result against
other agents by averaging the total accumulated utility
over all trials on various negotiation domains. We have
surveyed existing negotiation agents to examine the ac-
ceptance criteria that they employ. A description of the
acceptance conditions that we tested is listed in Table 2.
2.1 Existing Acceptance Conditions
We give a short overview of decoupled acceptance con-
ditions used in literature and current agent implemen-
tations. We are primarily interested in acceptance con-
ditions that are not specically designed for a single
agent. We do not claim the list below is complete; how-
ever it serves as a good starting point to categorize cur-
rent decoupled acceptance conditions. We surveyed the
entire pool of agents of ANAC 2010, including Agent
K and Nozomi [25], Yushu [1], IAM(crazy)Haggler [5],
FSEGA [24] and Agent Smith [27]. We also examined
well-known agents from literature, such as the Trade-o
agent [7], the Bayesian learning agent [11], ABMP [13],
equilibrium strategies of [9], and time dependent negoti-
ation strategies as dened in [22], i.e. the Boulware and
Conceder tactics.
Table 3: A selection of existing decoupled acceptance
conditions.
AC   Agent
ACnext(;) 1 0 FSEGA, Boulware,
Conceder, Trade-o,
Equilibrium strategies
1.02 0 IAM(crazy)Haggler
1.03 0 Bayesian Agent
ACconst() 1 - FSEGA
0.9 - Agent Smith
0.88 - IAM(crazy)Haggler
T
ACtime(T) 0.92 - Agent Smith
Listed in Table 3 is a selection of generic acceptance
conditions found.
Some agents also use logical combinations of dierent
acceptance conditions at the same time. This explains
why some agents are listed multiple times. We will not
focus on the many possible combinations of all accep-
tance conditions that may thus be obtained; we will
study the basic acceptance conditions in isolation with
varying parameters. However in addition to this we have
studied a small selection of combinations. We leave fur-
ther combinations for future research.
As can be seen from Table 3, in our sample the
most commonly used acceptance condition is ACnext =
ACnext(1;0), which is the familiar condition of accept-
ing when the opponent's last oer is better than the
planned oer of the agent.
2.2 Experimental Setup
For our experimental setup we employed Genius (Gen-
eral Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent multi-
purpose Usage Simulation) [17]. This environment,
which is also used in ANAC, helps to facilitate the de-
sign and evaluation of automated negotiators' strate-
gies.
We use the negotiation tactics that were submitted
to ANAC 2010 [3]. ANAC is a negotiation competi-
tion aiming to facilitate and coordinate the research into
procient negotiation strategies for bilateral multi-issue
negotiation.
3 Results and Conclusion
A selection of the experimental results are summarized
in Table 4. We observe that designing an eective
acceptance condition is challenging because of the
acceptance dilemma: better oers may arrive in the
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Acceptance Condition Description
ACconst() Accept when the opponents bid is better than .
ACnext Accept when the opponents bid is better than our upcoming bid.
ACtime(T) Accept when time T has passed.
ACcombi(MAX) Accept when the current oer is the best in a previous time window.
Built-in mechanism The acceptance condition that was originally present in the agents.
Table 2: Acceptance conditions employed by various agents.
Acceptance Agreement % Average utility Total
Condition of agreements avg
ACcombi(MAX) 99% 0.679 0.675
Built-in mechanism 82% 0.768 0.627
ACtime(0:99) 99% 0.622 0.618
ACnext 72% 0.787 0.567
ACconst(0:8) 38% 0.851 0.324
ACconst(0:9) 26% 0.935 0.239
Table 4: Utility scores of agents equipped with an acceptance condition
future, but waiting for too long can result in a break o
of the negotiation, which is undesirable for both parties,
especially in the setting of one-shot negotiations. In
short:
(The acceptance dilemma)
Total average utility = Agreement percentage

Average utility of agreements.
This formula captures the essence of the acceptance
dilemma: accepting bad to mediocre oers yields more
agreements of relatively low utility. While accepting
only the best oers produces less agreements, but of
higher utility. Acceptance conditions will have to nd a
balance between both goals.
ACtime(T), with T close to 1 is a sensible criterion
to avoid a break o at all cost. However, the resulting
deal can be anything, so the resulting agreement utility
is very low. ACconst() is not very advantageous to
use, as the choice of the constant  is highly domain-
dependent. In very cooperative domains, ACconst()
will accept an oer that can be relatively bad, i.e. it
could have done much better. On the other hand, in
highly competitive domains, it may simply `ask for too
much' and may rarely obtain an agreement.
The standard condition ACnext is often used by ne-
gotiating agents. However, from our results, it is ap-
parent that it does not always yield optimal agree-
ments. We have devised more sophisticated accep-
tance conditions by combining existing ones such as
ACnext and ACtime(T) into new ones; one example be-
ing ACcombi(MAX). These combinations outperformed
the other conditions we have tested.
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